Abstract: This paper argues that discourse givenness of an expression does not automatically result in that expression being G(IVEN)-marked, contra a claim by Büring (2016). I show in particular that under standard assumptions about the representation of focus, there is no way of giving a uniform phonological interpretation of F- and G-marking if all discourse given expressions are required to be G-marked.

Keywords: G-marking; Discourse givenness; F-marking; Focus

1. Introduction

In any theory of givenness it is necessary to distinguish between two distinct concepts: discourse givenness and G(IVEN)-marking. Discourse givenness is a relation that obtains between syntactic expressions (or their meanings) and discourse contexts whenever the expression is already in some sense present in or entailed by the context. G-marking, in contrast, is a feature of a syntactic expression (or its meaning) that imposes a certain requirement on the discourse context. While the two concepts are distinct, they are tied together in that total G-marking of an expression, i.e. G-marking of the expression itself and everything it dominates, signals the need for that expression to be discourse given. The need for a totally G-marked expression to be discourse given is uncontroversial. What other relations obtain between G-marking and discourse givenness are more controversial. In this paper I focus on the following claim by Büring (2016)1, and argue that it should be abandoned.

**Büring’s Claim**: All discourse given expressions are G-marked.

To make the discussion concrete, I adopt the following assumptions:

(1) a. An expression x is **discourse given** in discourse context C if there is an expression in C that either (cross-categorially) entails x or is coreferent with x.2

b. If an expression is **totally G-marked** it is grammatically required to be discourse given.

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1 p. 26. Büring’s precise formulation of this constraint comes in the form of the following two conditions:

**MAXIMIZE INFORMATION STRUCTURE MARKING**:

a. If G-marking of a constituent is licensed by [the GIVENNESS CONDITION], it is obligatory.

**GIVENNESS CONDITION**:

A G-mark on constituent E is licensed in a context Cx if Cx provides a [Contextually Salient Meaning (CSM)], and that CSM stands in a G-RELATION to the ordinary denotation of E.

**G-RELATIONS**:

a. CSM is the referent of E in Cx
b. CSM and E are synonymous, at least contextually
c. CSM is a hypernym of E, at least contextually

Crucially, the GIVENNESS CONDITION allows distinct sub-expressions of a sentence to have their G-marking licensed by unrelated antecedents. For example, a verb’s G-marking could be licensed by a verb in the immediately preceding sentence while its object’s G-marking is licensed by a subject in a prior sentence. The Maximization condition makes G-marking obligatory whenever licensed.

2 This is a somewhat narrower conception of discourse givenness than one gets from Büring, where hedges are made for allowing contextual synonymy as well as (possibly contextual) hypernymity to give rise to discourse givenness. By using *if* rather than *iff*, (1a) characterizes a sub-part of what Büring characterizes. In this paper I will only be dealing with examples in which given expressions are syntactically identical with their presumed antecedents, and so this narrowing is harmless. See Schwarzschild (1999) for the definition of cross-categorial entailment. See Tancredi (1992) for one way of accounting for cases involving contextual synonomy and (contextual) hypernymity through accommodation.
(1b) is not a complete characterization of G-marking since it leaves open the question of what discourse consequences follow from G-marking an expression that contains one or more non-G-marked expressions. While I will be examining that possibility in detail below, in order not to prejudice the discussion I do not make any global assumptions about how such expressions relate to discourse context. Since G-marking affects both pronunciation and interpretation, I assume that it at least has to be represented in the syntax, so I indicate G-marking with a subscripted G on a syntactic expression.

To make the argument against Büring’s Claim, I adopt the uncontroversial assumption from Schwarzschild (1999) that an expression that is totally G-marked but neither is nor contains nor is contained in a focus or topic of any sort (henceforth a pure G-marked expression) obligatorily surfaces without a pitch accent. More generally, I assume that G-marking at a lexical level leads to deaccenting of the lexical item unless overridden by other concerns. This assumption together with Büring’s Claim explains the judgments in (2a) and (2b) and goes part of the way toward explaining the those in (2c) as well. (B₁ and B₂ are intended as separate follow-ups to A.)

(2) a. A: Who saw Mary?
   B₁: BILL saw Mary.
   B₂: #BILL saw MARY.⁴
   BILL [vp sawG MaryG]G

b. A: John saw Mary.
   B₁: No. BILL saw Mary.
   B₂: No. #BILL saw MARY.
   BILL [vp sawG MaryG]G

c. A: John saw Nancy.
   B₁: Then, #BILL saw Mary.
   B₂: Then, BILL saw MARY.
   BILL [vp sawG Mary(φ)]G

In the B sentences of (2a) and (2b), saw, Mary and the VP saw Mary are all discourse given. By Büring’s Claim, then, they must all three be G-marked. Since there is no motivation for F(ocu)-marking any of these expressions or of any of the nodes dominating them, all three are purely G-marked and so by assumption are required to surface without a pitch accent, making B₁ acceptable and B₂ not. (2c) differs from (2a) and (2b) in that in the second sentence of (2c) Mary does not qualify as discourse given and so is not required by Büring’s Claim to be G-marked. Since Mary is a terminal node, G-marking it would make it totally G-marked, thereby requiring it to be discourse given by (1b). Since this requirement is not met, Mary not only need not but cannot be G-marked.

If Mary is not G-marked in (2c), the assumption that pure G-marked expressions surface without an accent obviously cannot account for Mary being obligatory accented. I take the obligatory accenting of Mary in (2c) to follow from some version of the Nuclear Stress Rule (NSR)⁵ assigning a pitch accent to the rightmost accentable expression in a sentence, though for present purposes other options could as well be entertained. Since the precise formulation of the NSR remains

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⁴ Schwarzschild (1999) argues that G-marked expressions (his non-F-marked expressions) that dominate non-G-marked expressions need not be discourse given themselves, but that the result of interpreting all contained non-G-marked expressions as variables and existentially closing the result must be. While this level of complication is crucial for getting the details to come out right, I remain non-committal here about Schwarzschild’s specific analysis in order to make the argument as general as possible.

⁵ Mary here is intended as a focus, not as a contrastive topic, and so is pronounced with final fall intonation. With contrastive topic intonation the B₂ sentences are all acceptable.

⁶ For the original NSR, see Chomsky and Halle (1968).
controversial, I will rely only on the uncontroversial consequence of the NSR that a name in sentence-final object position gets accented when not G-marked. This covers both the case in which the name is F-marked, the more plausible option in (2c) given its contrast with Nancy, and the case in which it is not.

**Simplified NSR:** A sentence final name in object position gets obligatorily accented when not G-marked.

Since Mary is not G-marked in (2c), the Simplified NSR correctly predicts that Mary will be accented. This result holds regardless of whether the VP is taken to be G-marked or not, an issue left undecided by the other assumptions adopted above.

The above account shares with Büring the assumption that G-marking is distinct from and formally independent of F-marking. In this respect it departs from Schwarzschild’s analysis, under which G-marking is defined as absence of F-marking, i.e. as the converse of F-marking. While there are empirical reasons for not adopting this assumption from Schwarzschild (see fn. 8), for now it should suffice to note that to define G-marking as absence of F-marking would be to deny Büring’s Claim by stipulation, at least under the assumption that expressions required to be focused are F-marked. We can see this in the following example.

(3) Who does John’s mother love?

She loves [S] JOHN.

\[ \llbracket_{S} \text{She} \rrbracket_{G} \llbracket_{VP} \text{loves} \rrbracket_{G} \text{ JOHN}_{FG} \rrbracket_{G} \]

If F-marking and G-marking are stipulated to be converses of one another, then any expression that is required to be F-marked will be unable to be G-marked even if it also qualifies as discourse given. In (3), JOHN answers the question who and so qualifies as a focus by Question Answer Congruence (QAC). It is also discourse given, however, and hence by Büring’s Claim needs to be G-marked. If qualifying as a focus requires JOHN to be F-marked as Büring assumes, the assumption that F- and G-marking are converses of one another would make it impossible for JOHN to be G-marked despite its having a coreferent antecedent that makes it discourse given. Under the assumption that JOHN is F-marked in (3), Büring’s Claim only gets off the ground if F- and G-marking are mutually compatible.

It should be noted that F/G incompatibility can be maintained together with Büring’s Claim if JOHN is allowed to be non-F-marked in examples like (3) despite qualifying as a focus. All that is needed to account for the accenting facts is to allow a G-marked object to be accented when the VP it is contained in is not G-marked. While this possibility is not explicitly adopted in the literature to the best of my knowledge, I include it here for completeness.

Under the assumption that both loves and John are G-marked in (3), i.e. that Büring’s Claim is correct, the two possibilities just considered give rise to the F- and G-marking possibilities in (4) for the VP in (3). Here, the representations marked (A) are options left open under the assumption that JOHN is F-marked, and those marked (B) are options left open under the assumption that it is not. (I ignore the logical possibility of loves being F-marked since the context provides no justification for such F-marking. I leave it as an exercise for the reader to verify that adding the option of F-marking loves does not change the conclusions reached at the end of this paper.)

(4) a. i. \[ \llbracket_{VP} \text{loves} \rrbracket_{G} \text{ John}_{FG} \rrbracket_{G} \] (B)

ii. \[ \llbracket_{VP} \text{loves} \rrbracket_{G} \text{ John}_{FG} \rrbracket_{G} \] (A)

iii. \[ \llbracket_{VP} \text{loves} \rrbracket_{G} \text{ John}_{FG} \rrbracket_{G} \] (A)

b. i. \[ \llbracket_{VP} \text{loves} \rrbracket_{G} \text{ John}_{G} \rrbracket_{G} \] (B)
ii. \([vp \text{ loves}_G \text{ John}_G]_{FG}\) (B)

iii. \([vp \text{ loves}_G \text{ John}_{FG}]\) (A)

iv. \([vp \text{ loves}_G \text{ John}_{G\text{FG}}]\) (A)

Of these, (4a.i) can be eliminated as a possible representation for the answer in (3), since the VP \textit{loves John} is totally G-marked and hence required by (1b) to be discourse given but fails to be discourse given in the context provided. If F-marking is taken to have no effect on the discourse givenness requirement of G-marked expressions, (4a.ii) and (4a.iii) can be eliminated as well for the same reason. I do not, however, see how to establish that F-marking cannot affect discourse givenness requirements other than by stipulation, so I will continue to consider both of these representations to be viable if not very attractive options for now.

In the (4b) examples the VP is not G-marked, making it harder to eliminate any of the possibilities presented on the grounds of discourse givenness requirements. As seen above, allowing (4b.i) or (4b.ii) as representations will require abandoning the assumption that QAC identifies \textit{John} as a focus. However, if we accept this cost, the accenting of \textit{John} can be derived by requiring the VP to contain an accent, either because it is not G-marked ((4b.i), or (4b.ii)) or because it is F-marked ((4b.ii)). This requirement will have to override the deaccenting requirement induced by G-marking, but if it does so then with a suitably refined version of the NSR the observed obligatory accenting of \textit{John} can plausibly be correctly predicted. (4b.iii) represents Büring’s official proposed structure. This representation satisfies QAC, all G-marked expressions are discourse given in accordance with (1b), and all discourse given expressions are G-marked in accordance with Büring’s Claim. To generate an accent on \textit{John} while still maintaining Büring’s Claim it is necessary to assume that either the F-marking of \textit{John} (Büring’s official position) or the non-G-marking of the VP requires accenting of \textit{John} and that this effect overrides the deaccenting requirements of G-marking.\(^6\) (4b.iv) has all the merits of (4b.iii), but allows for one extra way of generating an accent on \textit{John}: by requiring the F-marked VP to contain an accent. It should be noted that the F-marking on the VP in (4b.ii) and (4b.iv) is not motivated in the context provided, making it plausible to eliminate these representations for that reason, though to maximize the chances of Büring’s Claim being viable I will continue to consider them potential candidate representations for now.

Summarizing, we eliminated (4a.i) from the running since it does not satisfy the discourse givenness requirements imposed by the total G-marking of the VP, but the remaining structures were seen to at least possibly satisfy the discourse givenness requirements imposed by G-marking and to retain the possibility of generating an obligatory accent on \textit{John}. Below I pair each of these remaining structures with the assumptions needed in order to adopt them.\(^7\)

\[(4')\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & [vp \text{ loves}_G \text{ John}_{FG\text{FG}}] \quad \text{(Accent F > Deaccent G and/or F contains accent > Deaccent G, FG exempt from givenness)} \\
\text{iii. } & [vp \text{ loves}_G \text{ John}_{FG}] \quad \text{(same as ii)} \\
\text{b. } & [vp \text{ loves}_G \text{ John}_G] \quad \text{(No QAC, *FG, non-G contains accent > Deaccent G)} \\
\text{ii. } & [vp \text{ loves}_G \text{ John}_G]_{FG} \quad \text{(No QAC, *FG, F contains accent > Deaccent G and/or)}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^6\) Krifka (2006) similarly assumes that the accenting of \textit{John} in examples like (3) comes from the phonological requirements of focus marking taking precedent over those of G-marking.

\(^7\) In (4'), \text{Accent F} is shorthand for \text{Accent F-marked lexical expressions}, \text{Deaccent G} for \text{Do not accent G-marked expressions}, and the symbol \(>\) indicates that when the two requirements flanking the symbol are in conflict the first one wins. \text{F contains accent} is shorthand for \text{All F-marked expressions contain an accent}. \*FG means that F- and G-marking are mutually incompatible. \text{FG exempt from givenness} means that an expression that is both F- and G-marked need not satisfy the normal discourse givenness requirements imposed by G-marking. \text{No QAC} means that Question Answer Congruence does not impose F-marking on the relevant answer. \text{Accent F} is taken to be applicable only for F-marked lexical items, while \text{F contains accent} can apply to non-lexical constituents as well. While \text{Accent F} could be taken to be a special case of \text{F contains accent}, the reverse does not hold.
any expression that is both F- and G-marked.

2. F- and G-Marking on Associated Foci

Our goal, recall, is to determine whether Büring’s Claim can be upheld, i.e. whether all discourse

given expressions need to be G-marked. The data in (2) and (3) were seen to be compatible with a

positive answer to this question. However, accounting for the data in (3) put important constraints

on possible explanations. Most significantly, accounting for (3) while maintaining Büring’s Claim

requires that the deaccenting of John induced by G-marking be overridden by accenting induced by

F-marking of John and/or the VP, and/or by absence of G-marking on the VP. When we turn to
data involving association with focus, however, we see that at least one way of imposing this
requirement cannot be upheld. To see this, consider the following example.

(5) The main difference between Bill and John is that John loves Sue, while

a. BILL loves ONLY Sue.

b. #BILL loves only/ONLY SUE.

In the context provided, both loves and Sue are discourse given. In order to account for the

association of Sue with only in (5a) I assume following Rooth (1986, 1992, 1995, 1996) that Sue

must also be focused, hence F-marked. Combined with Büring’s Claim that all discourse given

expressions are G-marked, this results in Sue being both F- and G-marked. Unlike with the

obligatorily accented JOHN in the Question Answer Congruence case considered in (3), however, in

(5) we find that Sue is incapable of bearing an accent.

This simple observation – that simultaneous F- and G- marking on a name results in that name

obligatorily lacking an accent when associated with only – is incompatible with Büring’s official

analysis of (3) since that analysis proposes that simultaneous F- and G- marking results in

obligatory accenting, not obligatory deaccenting. Indeed for all the alternative explanations as well

it becomes impossible to account for the accenting of JOHN in (3) by taking F- and G- marking on

a name to result in the name bearing an accent. This eliminates the explanations in (4a.ii) and

(4’a.iii), and it further restricts the possible explanations available in (4b.iii) and (4b.iv), as

illustrated by the crossing out below.

(4”)

a. ii. [vp lovesc Johnfc] (Accent F > Deaccent G or F contains accent > Deaccent G,

FG exempt from givenness)

iii. [vp lovesc Johnfc,fg] (same as ii)

b. i. [vp lovesc Johnfc] (No QAC, *FG, non-G contains accent > Deaccent G)

ii. [vp lovesc Johnlc] (No QAC, *FG, F contains accent > Deaccent G and/or


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8 It is presumably the requirement of F-marking that gives rise to the need for Sue to be phonologically prominent,
typically lengthened and strengthened. It is also presumably this requirement that makes it impossible to substitute the
fully reduced pronoun *er for Sue, an impossibility first noted by Susan Tunstall and cited in von Fintel (1994). The
impossibility of fully reducing a pronoun that acts in all other ways as G-marked empirically distinguishes discourse
given pronouns associated with operators like only from discourse given pronouns that have no need to also be analyzed as
F-marked. Distinguishing these two cases requires being able to simultaneously F- and G-mark a pronoun, arguing
against Schwarzschild’s assumption that F-marking is the converse of G-marking. Cf. also Beaver (2004) and Beaver
& Clark (2008) for arguments that non-reducibility of pronouns is linked to focus.

9 The argument made here only depends on the possibility of Sue being focused in (5a), not on that focus being
obligatory.

10 Elimination of F contains accent in (4a.i), (4a.ii), (4b.iii) and (4b.iv) is motivated since this assumption will require
any expression that is both F- and G-marked to be accented, including Sue in (5). In (4b.ii) simultaneous F- and G-
iii. \([\text{VP loves}_G \text{John}_{FG}]\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{non-}G & \text{ contains accent } \rightarrow \text{Deaccent } G \\
(\text{Accent } F & \rightarrow \text{Deaccent } G, \text{ and/or } \\
\text{non-}G & \text{ contains accent } \rightarrow \text{Deaccent } G, \text{ and/or } \\
F & \text{ contains accent } \rightarrow \text{Deaccent } G)
\end{align*}
\]

iv. \([\text{VP loves}_G \text{John}_{FG}]_F\)

(same as iii)

The only remaining possible explanations for the accenting of John all generate that accent by requiring the VP to contain an accent, either because the VP is non-G-marked or, in the case of (4b.ii), because it is F-marked.

If we continue to assume that for only to associate with an expression that expression must be F-marked, we can show that the possibility that the accent on JOHN in (3) is due to F-marking of the VP in (4"b.ii) must be eliminated with the following example.

(6) A: Did Mary criticize John at the party last night?
   B: Yes. In fact, she ONLY criticized John. (She didn’t dance, sing or in fact do anything other than criticize John.)
   \([\text{VP criticized}_G \text{John}_G]_F\)

Here the VP criticized John is the intuitive associate of only, requiring the VP as a whole to be F-marked. Given the assumption in (4"b.ii) that F- and G-marking are incompatible, it follows that the VP cannot also be G-marked. The VP is discourse given, however, along with criticized and John, so lack of G-marking on the VP directly violates Büring’s Claim that all discourse given expressions are G-marked. Additionally, in (6) John is incapable of bearing an accent, but the required pattern of F- and G-marking is identical to that found in (4"b.ii) above, a representation meant to capture the fact that JOHN in (3) is obligatorily accented. If accent is determined by the pattern of F- and G-marking, then the assumption that F-marking of the VP is responsible for the accenting of JOHN in (3) leads to the incorrect prediction that John in (6) should also be accented, giving us an independent reason for rejecting that assumption.

3. Extended Discourse

We are left now with four possible explanations for how to get JOHN to be accented in (3) on the assumption that Büring’s Claim is correct. All four explanations depend on the assumption that a non-G-marked expression has to contain an accent: F-marking of a constituent, either JOHN itself or the VP containing it, cannot be responsible for generating the accent. Consider now the following discourse.

(7) i. John saw Mary the other day.
   ii. She was just getting out of her car, and saw something out of the corner of her eye.
   iii. When she looked closer, she saw John walking by.
   iv. That must have been a. WHEN John saw Mary,
       b. when John SAW Mary
       c. when JOHN saw MARY.
In (7iv) the embedded sentence John saw Mary is all discourse given. That is, every single constituent of the sentence is discourse given since the discourse context contains the exact same sentence in (7i). Büring’s Claim then requires that every constituent of that sentence be G-marked in (7iv) as in (8) below.

$$[_{s} \text{John}_{\text{G}} \ [_{\text{vp}} \text{saw}_{\text{G}} \text{Mary}_{\text{G}}]_{\text{G}}$$

Whether the sentence also contains F-marking is left open by Büring’s Claim. However, since F-marking was seen to be incapable of overriding G-marking in determining whether a constituent contains an accent, adding F-marking to (8) is predicted to not by itself give rise to addition of any accents. While this prediction is compatible with the sentence being pronounced without an accent as it is in (7iv.a), it fails to account for the accenting possibilities in (7iv.b) and (7iv.c).

Is there another plausible way of accounting for the accenting possibilities in (7iv.b) and (7iv.c) without having to deny Büring’s Claim? I believe not. Aside from focus and givenness, the only other phenomenon that systematically affects accenting without altering the overt structure of a sentence in English is contrastive topic marking, but as we will see the alternative pronunciations cannot be attributed to contrastive topic marking.

Observationally, contrastive topic marking takes precedent over G-marking in determining accenting, as can be seen in the following discourse.\(^{12}\)

(9) A: Who did John see?
   B: JOHN\textsubscript{CT,G} saw\textsubscript{G} MARY\textsubscript{F}

In (9B) the subject JOHN is discourse given, making it G-marked by Büring’s Claim. Mary answers to the question who and is not discourse given, resulting in its being F-marked but not G-marked. Regardless of the G-marking status of the VP and S, the requirement seen in (4*b,i-iv) above that a non-G-marked constituent contain an accent will be satisfied by Mary’s being accented, as it must be by the Simplified NSR. This requirement will thus do nothing to force John to also contain an accent, and yet the accent on John is obligatory if John is a contrastive topic. Since interpretation of JOHN as a contrastive topic results in its being accented and not interpreting it as a contrastive topic results in its lacking an accent, it must be the contrastive topic marking that is responsible for this accent. If John is also G-marked as Büring’s Claim demands, it follows that accenting of a contrastive topic wins out over deaccenting of a G-marked expression.

If contrastive topic marking overrides G-marking in determining presence or absence of an accent, can contrastive topic marking be what makes the pronunciations in (7iv.b) and (7iv.c) possible? Unfortunately for Büring, the answer is a clear no. Contrastive topics are identified not only by their accent but more importantly by their intonation, being associated with a distinct intonation rise at the end of the intonation phrase they are contained in. While such an intonation contour could be argued to be obligatory with JOHN in (7iv.c), it is patently not obligatory with SAW in (7iv.b) or with MARY in (7iv.c), and without that intonation contour these words cannot be understood as contrastive topics. It follows that the possibility of accenting SAW and MARY without such a contrastive topic intonation contour must come from elsewhere, but as we’ve already seen it cannot come from the F- and G-marking requirements under the assumption of Büring’s Claim.

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\(^{12}\) Cf. Büring (2003) and Constant (2012, 2014) for a more in-depth discussion of contrastive topics. I use CT to identify contrastive topics, but remain neutral here on the question of whether this is an independent feature as it is in Büring (2003), indication of F-marking in the scope of a Contrastive Topic operator as in Constant (2014), or something else.
The above argument is premised on the assumption that discourse contexts only ever grow, and hence that the embedded sentences in (7iv) are all completely discourse given. If we abandon this assumption, this gives us one final possibility for saving Büiring’s Claim. Concretely, suppose that it is possible to change a discourse context not only by adding new things but also by removing sufficiently old things. If we allow for this possibility, then the pronunciation found in (7iv.a) will be obligatory when (7i) remains in the discourse context, as argued above, but (7iv.b) and (7iv.c) will be possible – and in fact will be the only possibilities – when (7i) has been removed from the discourse context.

While the logic of this approach cannot be faulted, it is unfortunately very difficult to see how it can be maintained in a principled fashion and still account for the modification of (7) in (7’) below.

(7’i) According to Bill, John saw Mary the other day.
(7’ii) She was just getting out of her car, and saw something out of the corner of her eye.
(7’iii) When she looked closer, she saw John walking by.
(7’iv) That must have been
   a. WHEN John saw Mary according to Bill.
   b. when John SAW Mary according to Bill.
   c. when JOHN saw MARY according to Bill.

(7’) differs from (7) only in containing the underlined occurrences of according to Bill. The occurrence in (7’i) is not discourse given and gets pronounced with an obligatory accent on Bill and an optional accent on according. The occurrences in (7’iv) can also be pronounced in the same way, with or without contrastive topic intonation. However, all three occurrences of this phrase in (7’iv) can also be fully deaccented. This deaccenting is only expected to be possible if according to Bill is part of the discourse context, but for this to be the case (7’i) cannot be entirely eliminated from the discourse context before the end of the sentences in (7’iv). If (7’) remains part of the discourse context when (7’iv) is processed, however, then we once again face the problem of accounting for the possible pronunciations in (7’iv.b) and (7’iv.c), since the occurrences of John saw Mary in (7’iv) will all be discourse given as well.

The revised example considered in (7’) does not, of course, show that the strategy of eliminating expressions from the discourse context cannot account for the possibilities found. However, in order to maintain such a strategy it must be possible for According to Bill in (7’i) to remain part of the discourse context while what is being attributed to Bill in (7’i), namely that John saw Mary, gets eliminated. A simple first-in-first-out approach to discourse context revision obviously would not allow for this possibility. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any general approach to discourse context revision that would make such an adjustment possible in a principled way. Without such an approach, however, adjustment of discourse context in the way required ends up as nothing more than an ad hoc stipulation whose only merit is that it makes it possible to retain Büiring’s Claim. If that is the cost it takes to maintain Büiring’s Claim, it is a cost not worth paying.

4. Discussion
The above argument took as a starting point the assumption that Büiring’s Claim is correct, i.e. that all discourse given expressions are G-marked. I examined various ways in which that claim could be upheld while still accounting for a range of challenging cases. It was first seen that Büiring’s Claim is easily compatible with run-of-the-mill examples like (2), and that it could be made compatible with the accenting of discourse given expressions satisfying QAC in (3) as well. Compatibility with this latter example, however, placed additional constraints on possible explanations. I then examined cases of association with focus where the associated focus is discourse given, and noted that these discourse given foci showed different overt behavior from the discourse given foci in the QAC cases, obligatorily lacking accent where their counterparts were obligatorily accented. This observation served to further restrict possible explanations of how F-
marking, G-marking and accentuation interact, but still left four possible explanations that kept Büring’s Claim intact. I then showed that the remaining possibilities all failed to account for observed variation in the accenting possibilities of examples that are all discourse given.

The fact that no potential analysis of the accenting of JOHN in (3) was left standing shows clearly that at least one of the assumptions made along the way needs to be discarded. The following assumptions played key roles in the argument:

i. **Büring’s Claim**: All discourse given expressions are G-marked.
ii. A totally G-marked expression is required to be discourse given. (1b)
iii. G-marked expressions are deaccented unless there is an overriding requirement for them to be accented.
iv. **Simplified NSR**: A non-G-marked sentence-final name in object position is obligatorily accented.
v. The intuitive associate of only needs to be focused in the cases examined.
vi. The accenting alternatives in (7iv) cannot be explained by appealing to something other than just their F- and G-marking pattern.

While any one of these assumptions can be challenged, assumptions (ii) through (vi) stand on solid ground. The need to connect a sentence’s relation to the discourse context with its pronunciation makes it necessary to represent some aspect of that relation in the syntax under standard assumptions about the organization of grammar. G-marking is simply the label given to whatever in the syntax connects the need to be discourse given with the need to be deaccented in the core cases. It is of course possible to deny the assumptions in (ii) or (iii), but to do so would amount to denying that givenness is an independent phenomenon, making it necessary to deny (i) as well. Regarding the Simplified NSR, while specific formulations of the NSR may well be challenged, assumption (iv) is the most basic piece of data that every formulation of the NSR aims to capture and as far as I know is without exception in English. **Simplified NSR** is simply a label for whatever explanation is given for this basic observation. The assumption in (v) could plausibly be challenged, though to the best of my knowledge no such challenge has been successful to date, and I do not see any promise along this path. The only plausible counterexamples are cases like those examined here where the intuitive associate is discourse given, and ample evidence has been amassed over the years showing that a discourse given associate of only can be phonetically distinguished from a discourse given expression that cannot be analyzed as a focus, bolstering the claim that focus is needed for association. The assumption in (vi) is perhaps the least justified assumption on the list, and is impossible to establish beyond doubt since it amounts to a claim that no future analysis will uncover other features or phenomena that affect accenting in ways distinct from those we are familiar with today. However, restricting our attention to what is presently known I know of no grounds for denying (vi), and in particular I showed that the variation in accenting possibilities found cannot plausibly be explained by allowing a discourse context to be adjusted by removing older utterances. Other possibilities no doubt exist, though until they can be shown to provide the needed explanations for the examples examined here, (vi) remains the default assumption. Regardless of the actual truth of assumptions (ii) through (vi), logically it follows that if we accept those assumptions, then the only way of accounting for all of the data examined in this paper is by denying (i), i.e. by denying Büring’s Claim.

While it is not my goal in this paper to develop an alternative analysis of the accenting facts, I sketch in outline form what an analysis that abandons Büring’s Claim might look like. Without the need for all discourse given expressions to be G-marked, it becomes possible to analyze JOHN in

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13 More generally it suffices for the intuitive associate of only to be contained in a focus, though in the cases examined the largest constituent within the c-command domain of only containing the intuitive associate is the intuitive associate itself.
the QAC example (3) as F-marked but not G-marked by taking the VP in the answer to have the VP in the question as its givenness antecedent. Its accenting can then follow from either the Simplified NSR or from a requirement that F-marked expressions contain an accent. Under either such analysis, John in the association with only example (5) can be distinguished from JOHN in (3) by being obligatorily both F- and G-marked, with the G-marking winning out in determining accentuation but F-marking imposing a requirement of phonological prominence, in line with a long line of research going back at least to Rooth (1995). There would be no contradiction between the QAC case and the association with only case since the relevant sentences would differ in whether John is G-marked. Finally, the optionality in accentuation found in the extended discourse examples in (7) and (7') can be accounted for by taking the different accenting patterns to derive from relating the final sentence of the discourse to different antecedents within the discourse context rather than by having the G-marking possibilities fixed by the discourse context as a whole. While this rough sketch leaves all of the details to be worked out, it is at least consistent with all of the examples examined in this paper.

References
von Fintel, Kai: 1994, Restrictions on Quantifier Domains, Graduate Student Linguistics Association (GSLA), UMass Amherst.

14 This fits Schwarzschild’s (1999) assumption that G-marking is maximized (his AvoidF) if G-marking of the VP wins out over G-marking of the object when G-marking is possible for either one alone but not for both together.
15 More cautiously, the F- and G-marking should be taken to be obligatory only with respect to the decision to identify the question as both the givenness antecedent and the focus antecedent for the answer.
16 See Tancredi (2015a,b, 2016, 2017) for the beginnings of an explanation along these lines.